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Legal ImpHcations of the Soviet Microwave 
Bombardment of the U.S. Embassy 
INTRODUCTION 
.Although the U.S. embassy in Moscow has been the target of 
Soviet microwave bombardment at least since 1959/ it has only 
been the publicity surrounding the former U.S. Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union, Walter Stoessel's health that has brought this 
practice to public prominence.2 The primary concern about such 
radiation is the health of the staff, employees, and families 
within the embassy who are subjected to it. While the recent 
radiation levels have been relatively Iowa and are of the type 
associated with the use of radio, and television stations (non-
ionizing, as compared to X-rays or Gamma rays 4) little is 
1 Microwave radiation was discovered within the embassy during Vice President 
Nixon'. visit to Moscow in 1959, NY Times, May 1, 1976, at 21, col. 2. 
2 Bpeculation and conjecture between Btoellel's reported "strange blood ailment," 
Bolton Globe, February 16, 1976, at 1, col. 1, and the microwave radiation were 
preeeded and fueled by reports of recent increases in the radiation levels found in 
the emba.llay, 'NY Times, February ll, 1976, at 16, col. 4. Before the Stoenel inci· 
dent, however, it was Jack Anderson who "broke" the story of the "MOIcow Big· 
w" in Kay of 1972. Washington Post, May 10, 1972, at B10, col. 2. 
a Levels have been 1811 than two microwatts per square centimeter since protests 
were made in February, 1976, and aluminum aereens which have been inatalled hall 
reduced this to Iell than 1 mierowatt per square centimeter inaide the emb...,.. 
NY Times, July 8, 1976, at 1, col. 1; Telephone Conversation with State Depart-
ment oflleial, Dixie Grimes, December 2, 1976. These levels are to be compared, how· 
ever with the high of 18 microwatts per square centimeter in 1975, NY Times, 
April 26, 1976, at 5, col. 1 and perhaps as high as 400 microwatts per square centi· 
meter'in earlier years, Paul Brodeur, Microwave8 11, The New Yorker, December 
20,1976, at 47, col. 2 (hereinafter cited as Microwave8 II). 
4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, vol. 6, pp. 651·52, vol. 15, 389 (15th ed. 1975) j 
NY Times, February 26, 1976, at 1, coL 8. 
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known of the long range medical effects of prolonged exposure 
to low levels of microwave radiation, but recent studies sight 
possible dangers:1 The State Department is concerned enough 
at least to have commissioned Johns Hopkins University to con-
duct research on 600 embassy employees in order to deter-
mine the medical effects, if any, of past exposure they may have 
received. II 
This article will examine the legal effects of the microwave 
bombardment. The analysis will attempt to resolve the follow-
ing issues: I. whether the radiation bombardment is a prima 
facie T violation of international law, so as to give rise to Soviet 
responsibility of some kind; II. whether any defenses are avail-
able to the Soviets for their actions; III. what remedies may 
exist for the United States. 
I. Is THE RADIATION BOMBARDMENT A PRIMA FACIE VIOLATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW so AS TO GIVE RISE TO SOVIET RESPONSI-
BILITY! 
The relevant international law encompassing microwave bom-
bardment of an embassy is the Vienna Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations (hereinafter, "Vienna Convention").8 Al-
though only arguably binding as representing customary inter-
. national law for non-signatories,' the Vienna Convention is 
II HearingB on Radiation Control fOT Health and Safety Act of 1967 Before the 
Senate Commerce Committee, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 2 at 963 (1968) (herein-
after cited as 1968 Hearings); BUREAU OP RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, SYMPOSIUM ON 
THE BIOLOGICAL EpPECTS AND HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OP MICROWAVE RADIATION, 
June 1970, Print by the Depa.rtment of H.E.W. (hereinafter cited as SYMPOSIUM). 
II Dixie Grimes conversation, B1lpra note 3; NY Times, July 2, 1976, at 20, col. 2; 
Boston Globe, May 31, 1977, at 1, col. 6. 
T A prima facie violation will herein be considered to constitute: any set of facts 
sufficient to make out a violation of international law if no defenses were available. 
8United Nations Doc. A/CONF 20/13, April 16,1961; 55 Am. J. Int'I. L. 1064 
(1961). 
'D'AMATO. THE CONCEPT OP CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 103-66 (1971) 
(hereinafter cited as D'AMATO); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OP PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 12 (2nd ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited as BROWNLIE); P.J. O'KEEl'E, 
Immunities of the Diplomatic Family, 25 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 329, at 330 (1976) 
(hereinafte.r cited as O'Keefe). 
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clearly law between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as they have both 
ratified it.lO 
If the radiation bombardment is a violation of the Vienna 
Oonvention it would have to be in violation of those articles con-
fering the privilege of inviolability upon the embassy premises,ll 
the Ambassador,12 his residence 18 or his staff.14 
A. Inviolability of the Diplomatic Agent 
Article 29 of the Vienna Convention states: 
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He 
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The 
receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall 
take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his per-
son, freedom or dignity. 
It should be remembered that the underlying purpose of in-
violability like all the privileges and immunities bestowed by 
the Convention "is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the 
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as 
representing States." 111 In accord with that reasoning the priv-
ilege of inviolability is premised on the assumption that the 
mission can operate more efficiently if its agents are free from 
harm and insult. IS To achieve this end a duty is imposed upon 
the receiving State which requires it to "offer the entitled per-
10 U.S.S.R. ratification March 28, 1964, effective April 24, 1964. 500 U.N.T.S. 
96, 204 (1964). U.S.A. ratification effective December 13, 1972. U.S.T. 23.3.3227; 
T.I.A.S. 7502. Bee D' AMATO, 8upra note 9, at 107. 
11 Vienna Convention, 8upra note 8, Art. 22. 
12 Id. Art. 29. 
13Id. Art. 30. 
14 Id. Art. 37. 
111 Id. Preamble; The theory of ne impediatur legatio or "functional theory" is 
now one of the predominant conceptual bases for diplomatic privileges and im-
munities (having supplanted the theory of exterritoriality). This theory satisfies 
"the need of states for independence and freedom of action, which requires that 
their diplomatic representatives be exempt from all exercise of authority which 
might impede the performance of their functions." Preuss. Capacity for Lega-
tion and the Theoretical Ba8is of Diplomatic Immunitie8, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q.REV. 170, at 
187 (1933) (hereinafter cited as Preuss). 
16 O'Keefe, 8upra note 9, at 343; League of Nations Committee of Experts for 
the Progressive Codification of International Law. Diplomatic Privilege8 and Im-
munities, 20 AM. J. INT'L. L. Spec. Supp. 149 (1926). 
94 BoSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JO'OBNAL [Vol. I, No.1 
son all the protection that is necessary to safeguard him in his 
life and the pursuit of his occupation." 11 
The difficulty arises, of course, in determining the extent of 
this duty to protect the diplomat. With respect to the crucial 
words: "shall treat him with due respect and shall take all ap-
propriate steps to prevent ... " one commentator has pointed 
out, 
In a practical sense, the determination of "appropriate 
steps" must rest with the receiving State. This is the only 
authority capable of assessing accurately the extent of the 
danger posed by any threat and the response necessary to 
thwart it.11 
However true this may be, its validity can be questioned, when 
applied to dangers other than those posed by non-officials or 
officials acting ultra vires. In other words, as a practical matter 
only the receiving State itself can determine the scope of its 
duty to protect the diplomat from non-official actions against 
him. But is the receiving State also to determine the scope of 
its duty to protect the diplomat from official actions against him' 
What is, the scope and effect of this phrase' 
Each State will have its own interpretation, but whether the 
sending State, the host State, or some third party ultimately 
-determines how far this duty to protect from harm of insult 
extends, it is submitted that an objective standard should be 
used. The following principles have been suggested: 1) the mere 
presence of damage does not, ipso facto, impose responsibility 
upon the receiving State. 2) The receiving State's duty is some-
what greater than the due diligence owed to prevent injuries to 
aliens. 3) The obligation would have to be directly propor-
tional to the predictability of the commission of harm or insult, 
or in other words, the greater the risk, the greater the duty.10 
In applying such principles to obtain an objective standard 
several points should be noted: first, as previously stated,20 the 
IT 0 'Keefe, IUfWG note 9, at 344. 
IBld. 
10 8 CANADIAN Y.B. OJ' I.T'L L. 356 (1970). 
10 866 text aeeompan,.ing note 16, IUprG. 
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duty owed to the agent extends not only to harm (injury to 
body), but to insult (injury to dignity) as well. Second, there 
exists in most industrialized nations safety standards for maxi-
mum microwave irradiation exposure, developed for industrial 
occupational safety. Thus, from a legal standpoint, if the duty 
owed to a diplomatic agent is greater than that which is owed to 
aliens, and if the predictability of the harm or insult is also a 
factor in determining the duty owed, then at minimum it would 
seem a duty to prevent harm arises on the part of the receiving 
state at the moment when recognized safety levels of radiation 
in the sending state's embassy exceeds domestic safety levels, 
for it is for the purpose of preventing harm that those standards 
are established. 
However sound this hypothesis may be in the abstract, when 
it is applied to the specific facts of the U.S. embassy's situation 
in Moscow, several conceptual difficulties arise. Consider: 1) the 
U.S. safety standard is 10,000 microwatts per square centimeter 
(micro W Icm2 ) , 2) the Soviet safety standard is 10 micro 
W Icm2, and 3) the exposure levels in the U.S. embassy have 
at times surpassed the Soviet standard, but have not come near 
the U.S. standard.21 Does a duty arise because the Soviet stand-
ard has been exceeded T Is the U.S. estopped from claiming a 
duty exists because the U.S. standard has not been exceeded' 
To answer these questions it is necessary to analyze the ob-
jectives behind each country's safety standard, keeping in mind 
the legal standard the host State must ultimately meet (viz. pre-
vention of harm and insult 22). 
The U.S. standard of 10,000 micro W Icm2 was first proposed 
in 1953 23 and was based on theoretical grounds with an assump-
21 Reports of high levels of exposure have ranged anywhere from 18 microwatts 
per square centimeter to 400 microwatts per square centimeter, 8ee note 3, supra. 
22 Vienna Convention, supra note 8, Art. 29. It is in fact the objectives which 
those safety standards represent, and not the standards themselves which is germane 
in determining the legal standard. So the mere fact that a country has not estab· 
lished a safety standard would not relieve it of its duty; the reasons underlying 
safety standards exist irrespective of whether standards have been adopted. Adopted 
standards is merely a starting place. 
23 Paul Brodeur, Microwave8 I, The New Yorker, December 13, 1976, at 78, col. 3 
(hereinafter cited as Microwave8 I). 
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tion (generally accepted at the time) that the only effects of 
microwave irradiation were thermal ones (microwaves tend to 
heat organic tissue). It was also assnmed that since microwaves, 
unlike x-rays and Gamma-rays, are nonionizing they have no 
accumulative biomedical effect. 
However, in the 24 years since the current U.S. standard was 
proposed, there have been competent medical studies which 
seriously undermine the assumptions upon which the standard 
is based." For example, Dr. Milton Zaret, a practicing ophthal-
mologist and associate professor of ophthalmology at the New 
York University-Bellevue Medical Center, who has done exten-
sive microwave research both independently and for the U.S. 
government, has stated: 
"Th& American National Standard Institute's standard is 
not a safe standard. Instead it is a statement defining the 
highest possible degree of occupational risk. It was based 
solely on whole body thermal burden calculations. It ignored 
the question of organ lJensitivity and delayed effects follow-
ing chronic low level exposure." H 
Professor Herman Schwann of the University of Pennsylvania, 
who first proposed the U.S. standard has said, "Noone knows 
if standards of safe exposure, which may be adequate for adults, 
. are safe for children." 2, . 
In contrast to the U.S., the Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries 
have based their safety standards not on theoretical postula-
24 Professor Russel Carpenter, for one has conducted experiments which contradict 
both these RssumptiollB which caBts doubt upon the validity of that standard to 
prevent harm. Proflll8Or Carpenter testified as to the results of his experiments 
on microwave irradiation of the eyes of rabbits before the U.S. Senate Commerce 
Committee: ". . . the effect of microwave power on the eye can be cumulative, so 
that sinlle episodes of exposure to radiation which are not of themselves harmful, 
may beeome hazardous if they are repeated sufficiently often .... Microwave cata-
racts are not merely the reault of microwave heating, but are caused by some other 
property of this radiation." 1968 H earing8, 8upra note 5 at 963·64 (emphasis 
added). 
211 HeariagB on the Effectivenes8 of the 1968 Radiation Control for Health and 
Safety Act Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 101 
(1978) (hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings). 
2G 1968 Hearings, supra note 5, at 700. Two children were sent home from the 
U.S. Ewbasey in Moscow· for blood tests in June, 1976. NY Times, June 26, 1976, 
at 3, col. 1. 
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tions, but on field observation, surveys and experimentation. At 
the 1970 Symposium on the Biological Effects and Health Im-
plications of Microwave Radiation, Karel Marha of Czecho-
slovakia explained how their 10 micro W /cm2 standard was 
developed: 
From the point of protecting people against possible 
damaging effects of electromagnetic fields, naturally the 
threshold biological effects of the field intensity are of im-
portance. In respect of the heat effect it is agreed that heat-
ing of the organism occurs at power densities of 10-15 [thou-
sand] [micro] W /crn2 in animals as well as man. This level 
for thermal effects is in agreement with theoretical calcu-
lations. 
For cataract induction 10 [thousand] [micro] W /cml ; 
for changes in auditory apparatus 1 [thousand] [micro] 
W /cm2 ; for feeling of pain in the skin .6 [thousand] [micro] 
W/cml • 
For microwave frequencies biological effects may be in-
duced at power densities as low as .1 [thousand] [micro] 
W /cm2 • • • • Considering the large differences observed in 
the sensitivity of different people an additional safety factor 
of 10 was applied to arrive at the value of 10 micro W /cm2• 
. . . . These maximum admissible values of irradiation 
admissible in Czechoslovakia were decided so as to prevent 
not only damage to the organism, but to prevent unpleasant 
SUbjective feelings as well.27 
Thus the fact that the U.S. safety standard at most is meant 
only to be protective against harm, coupled with the fact that 
its effectiveness of achieving even this limited goal is question-
able, shows that the U.S. safety standard cannot adequately be 
used to meet the legal standard of preventing harm and insult. 
On the other hand, the question of whether the legal standard 
may even be below the U.S.S.R. 's safety standard is still open. 
Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., standards have been estab-
lished assuming steady frequency and relatively short term 
irra,diation. This is because the standards are set primarily for 
industry, where it is assumed the worker would be exposed to 
just one frequency of microwaves for a maximum of eight hours 
17 SYKPOBIUK,8'Upra note 5, at 189, 190. 
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a day. However, the" Moscow Signal" (as the microwave bom-
bardment of the U.S. Embassy is sometimes called) is carried 
on around the clock and is generated at multiple frequencies 
with widely fluctuating patterns.2S Both U.S.29 and Eastern 
Bloc Countries 80 agree that the safety standards break down 
under such conditions. For example, Czechoslovakia lowers their 
standard to 1 micro W Icm2 when it is assumed exposure is at 
certain pulsed frequencies for 24 hour periods.81 
The above considerations demonstrate that the host State's 
duty to prevent harm to the diplomat may arise when micro-
wave levels are as low as 1 micro W Icm2, and clearly arise at 
levels of 10 micro W Icm2, but as has been often repeated, the 
duty owed by the host State extends to prevent insult as well as 
harm. For this aspect of the duty other considerations such as 
the knowledge that physical harm can be induced by microwave 
irradiation without any conscious awareness by the subject, U 
lack of any consent on the part of those being irradiated, the 
intentional aspect of the irradiation they are being exposed to,88 
and the lack of any real medical certainty to the possible extent 
of damage being inflicted upon them are all relevant factors and 
combine to support a conclusion that: as long as there is a com-
petent medical basis which can support reasonable doubts as to 
the safety of prolonged irradiation of humans, then it is reason-
ably foreseeable that the dignity of humans subjected to any 
levels of intentional exposure without his or her consent would 
be affronted. Consequently a corresponding duty would arise on 
the part of the host State to prevent such indignity. 
But regardless of the acceptability of this last conclusion that 
any level of intentional irradiation is a dereliction of the host 
State's duty, it is submitted that in the present situation, the 
fact that the 10 micro W Icm2 safety standard has been exceeded 
is sufficient to state, prima facie, that the Soviet Union has 
28 Microwave. 11, aupra note 3, at 47. 
28 SYlIPOSruM, aupra note 5, at 20. 
so leI., at 189. 
SlId., at 190. 
82 1968 Hearing., aupra 'note 5, at 964. 
88 NY Times, February 26, 1976, at 1, col. 3. 
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failed in its responsibility to either treat the diplomatic agent 
"with due respect" or to take" all appropriate steps to prevent 
any attack on his person or dignity." 
B. Inviolability 0/ the Premises 
Article 22 of the Vienna Convention states: 
1. The premises of the Mission shall be inviolable. The 
agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except 
with the consent of the head of the Mission. 
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all 
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the Mission 
against any intrusion of damage and to prevent any disturb-
ance of the peace of the Mission or impairment of its dignity. 
Paragraph two of this Article imposes a duty on the host 
state to prevent any impairment of the dignity of the Mission's 
premises. This paragraph can be used both, as a basis for 
strengthening the conclusion just reached (that the microwave 
bombardment violates the host state's duty to the diplomatic 
agent), and as a basis for arguing that the bombardment is also 
in violation of the host state's duty to the diplomatic mission 
itself. To reduce the amount of radiation penetrating into the 
U.S. embassy, it has been necessary to install aluminum screens 
on all the embassy windows.84 It appears that these screens not 
only accentuate the indignity imposed upon the diplomatic 
agents, by acting as a constant reminder of the microwaves' un-
seen presence, but the screens ~lso mar the dignity of the embas-
sy itself by physically symbolizing to visitors and passerbys the 
fact that the embassy is being subjected to treatment against its 
consent. 
However, a more consequential question concerning Article 
22 is not so much whether the microwave radiation imposes an 
indignity upon the premises, but whether it constitutes an im-
permissible "entry" within the meaning of paragraph one. It 
should first be pointed out that article 22 does not put the em-
bassy premises outside the territorial limits of the receiving 
84 NY Times, April 26, 1976, at 5, col. I. 
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State, but merely makes them inviolable.311 Although technically 
still under the jurisdiction of the receiving State, inviolability 
prohibits all nonconsenual entries onto the embassy premises, 
and places the duty of conformance upon the receiving State. 
The duty of the receiving State to the sending State is the 
positive one of preventing entry upon the premises of a mis-
sion by persons clothed with government authority .... Pro-
tection against invasion of the premises of a mission or of a 
member of a mission means protection against any attempt 
to enter the premises against the will of the chief or other 
members of the mission. The duty, however, goes further 
than that. The receiving State is under a duty to protect 
the premises against any acts tending to interfere with the 
enjoyment or possession of such premises.86 
This excerpt from a draft containing language identical ill 
material respects to Article 22, supports a construction of the 
phrase" agents of the receiving State may not enter ... " is to 
be considered interpretive and explanative of inviolability rather 
than a specific prohibition in addition to inviolabilty. Noncon-
sensual entries by agents are specifically limited as this repre-
sents the most notorious violation of the concerns behind in-
violability, those concerns being "to ensure the efficient per-
formance of the functions of diplomatic missions" 87 by pre-
venting interference "with the enjoyment or possession of such 
premises. " 88 
The fact that nonconsensual entries by agents are spe-
cifically proscribed does not preclude the possibility that non-
consensual entries of microwaves might not also be pro-
scribed. Although microwaves are not specifically limited 
by the words of Article 22, the same concerns which lead to 
the specific limitation of agents are nonetheless present in the 
311 The principle of exterritoriality has been generally discredited as a fiction 
without basis in law or fact. 7 WHITEMAN, DIGEST 01' INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 et 
Beq. (1970) (hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN) ; PREUSS, 8'Upra note 15, at 183. 
36 Harvard Research Paper. 26 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 56 (1932) (hereinafter 
cited as Harvard Research Paper). 
87 Vienna Convention, 8'Upra note 8, Preamble. 
88 Harvard Research Paper,8'Upra note 36. 
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case of microwaves. And microwave bombardments can violate 
these concerns just as easily, although perhaps not as notori-
ously, as the agents of the host state, for it is clear that certain 
levels of microwave irradiation can interfere with the enjoy-
ment of the premises.1I1 
In the case of the host State's agents the effect of requiring 
the mission's consent is that of giving control to the sending 
state of who may and who may not enter the mission. I.e., it is 
the sending Sta~e who is given the right to decide how much in-
terference with the enjoyment of their premises they will or will 
not tolerate from the host State's agents (at least within the 
embassy's premises). Since the same concerns that are present 
with respect to "agents" are present with respect to "micro-
waves," the reasons which give the sending State the right 
to decide what kind and how many agents are to be allowed 
on the premises also argue for giving the sending State ~ 
the right to decide what kind and how much radiation is 
to be allowed in its airspace. In other words, the concerns 
behind inviolability require that consent be given by the mis-
sion before any microwave bombardment by the host state could 
take place, and failure to obtain such consent would be in viola-
tion of Article 22. 
The above argument is of necessity based on an interpolative 
reading of Article 22,as the presence of microwaves was not an 
explicit concern of the Convention's parties. It therefore is 
open to the infirmities associated with such construction. For 
instance, it would most likely be attacked on the ground that 
prohibition against entry in Article 22 is directed at "the agents 
of the receiving state" and to construe microwaves as "agents" 
contravenes the "ordinary meaning" principle of treaty inter-
89 For example, "Typical symptoms are pains in the head and eyes, fatigue con-
nected with overall weakness, dizziness, and vertigo when standing for a longer 
period. Sleep at night is restive and superficial, there is sleepiness during the day. 
Exposed individuals are subject to changing moods, they often become irritated 
to the point of becoming intolerable. Hypochondric reactions are manifested along 
with feelings of fear. Sometimes those affected feel nervous tension or, on the 
contrary mental depression connected with inhibition of intellectual functions mainly 
decreased memory." SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 188; OF. Boston Globe, May 31, 
1977, at 9, col. 2. 
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pretation. fO However, "the doctrine of ordinary meaning in-
volves only a presumption; a meaning other than the ordinary 
may be established, but the proponent of the special meaning 
has a burden of proof. "fl The previous analysis has attempted 
to overcome this presumption by arguing that the underlying 
principle (if not the words) of Article 22 has been violated by 
the entry of microwaves into the embassy without its consent. 
Hence to obviate violating the principle (and a fortiori the 
parties' intention), the words which are meant to effectuate that 
principle should be given a broader than ordinary meaning!2 
Yet even if this argument ultimately fails to meet its burden of 
overcoming the ordinary meaning of Article 22, this in no way 
affects the previous inviolability arguments based on Article 29. 
It might also be noted that similar personal inviolability argu-
ments can be made with respect to the inviolability ?f the fami-
lies and staff of the diplomatic agents!a 
C. Soviet Responsibility 
If the Soviet microwave bombardment of the U.S. embassy 
does co~stitute violations of the Convention as the prior anal-
ysis suggests, does this give rise to any responsibility on the 
part of the Soviets! To quote from the Chorzow Factory case," 
" ... it is a principle of international law, and even a general 
conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves 
an obligation to make reparation ... the Court has already said 
that reparation is the indispensible complement of a failure to 
fa BaowNLR, ftpm note 9, at 607. 
flIt!. 
d As baa been said by Profeaaor Lauterpaeht, "The common intention [of the 
parties] in relation to the particular ease must be derived from the common inten-
tion of the treaty as a whole - from ita policy, ita object, and ita spirit." H. LAUTD-
PACBT. XXVI BlllTlSH Y.B. INT'L L. 48, 79-80 (1949). "Furthermore, what i8 
clear and unambiguous may not neeeaaarily be comprehensive. Hence even when 
the language of the treaty i8 clear it still remains to decide whether every category 
of event baa been comprised exclusivcly within it." 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw, 272-73 (1965). 
fa Vienna Convention, ftpra note 8, Art. 37, gives the same immunities to the 
diplomatie agent's family and stail as Article 29 gives to him. 
.. P.C.LT. Ber. A. No.9, at 21 (1927); BROWNLIlC, ftpra note 9, at 420. 
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apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated 
in the convention itself." 
In general the elements of responsibility may be summed up 
as follows: " 
1) An act or omission in violation of international law, 
(or put somewhat differently, conduct on the part of a State 
contrary to that required of it by given international obli-
gation) ; 
2) The unlawful act, as a general rule, must be imputable 
to the legal person of the State; that is to say, the conduct 
in question must be attributed to those organs or agents of 
the State's which are qualified by municipal law to accom-
plish "State acts"; 
3) resultant damage to the claimant State either directly, 
in the person of its nationals, or both.'6 
The first element has been shown in the Soviet's dereliction of 
their duty concerning inviolability. The second element may 
have been difficult to meet if it were not for Soviet acknowledge-
ment that they are responsible for the microwave radiation.'T 
The third element is met by damage done directly to the U.S. 
by affronting the dignity of its officials and embassy premises, 
and could also be met if physical harm can be shown to have 
resulted to any U.S. citizen while at the embassy as a result of 
being irradiated. In the latter case, particular items of financial 
loss directly resulting from the radiation would have to be 
proved,'8 whereas no proof of financial loss is necessary for the 
violation of the diplomatic immunity of inviolability49. 
'II A. FREEMAN, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES POR DENIAL OF JUSTICB, 
22 (Kraus reprint 1970) (hereinafter cited as FREEMAN). 
'6 Defenses to a State's responsibility are generally considered separately. BROWN-
LIE, at 442, 8'Upra note 9. For analysis see text accompanying notes 50·67, infra. 
'T The Soviets admitted using microwaves after having denied it for 15 years, 
NY Times, February 26, 1976, at 1, col. 3. Just one week earlier the Soviets, 
while acknowledging radiation presence in the embassy, claimed it was due to nearby 
industrial enterprises and was compounded by the embassy's roof antennas. NY 
Times, February 19, 1976, at 3, col. 6. 
'8 In such situations some authorities add a fourth element, viz. the exhaustion 
of local remedies, but there is dispute over this point. FREEMAN, supra note 45, 
at 22, fn.1. 
'9 BaowNLIE, 8'Upra note 9, 444·45. 
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II. ABE THEBE ANY DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS FOR 
THE1B ACTIONS 7 
When the Soviets acknowledged aiming microwaves at the 
U.S. embassy, they defended their action by claiming it is neces-
sary in order to interfere and block the U.S. listening devices 
located on the embassy premises:io The U.S. has apparently ac-
cepted this as' at least the primary purpose behind the radia-
tion,lil discounting other speculated reason.1i2 
Given the nature of their justification the Soviets most likely 
would classify their actions as a retortion.IiB Inconsistent with 
such a claim, however, is the fact, as shown previously, that 
their actions are in contravention of international law. "Retor-
tion is retaliation by one State for a harmful though lawful act 
of another State by a harmful and lawful act of the same or 
similar nature. " Ii4 
At best the Soviet's action could be termed a reprisal.1Ii "Re-
prisals, in contradistinction to retortion, are measures which 
would, taken in isolation, be unlawful, but may be taken excep-
tionally when one State violated the rights of another State, for 
the sole purpose of forcing the delinquent State to abide by 
law." 1i6 Thus, for the Soviet's bombardment to be justified by 
reprisal it must be shown inte,. alia that the U.S. 's eavesdrop-
-ping actions from the embassy premises are also illegal. 
. Generally mere eavesdropping on another country's commu-
nications is not "normally" considered to be an international 
GO NY Times, February 26, 1976, at 1, col 3. 
iiI The "impairment purpose" would be consistent with the facta that it does 
interfere with the listening devices and the beams are highly directional. NY Times, 
May 2, 1976, at 9, coli. 
Ii2 E.g., deliberately used to induce illneBB or to recharge hidden bugging device .. 
I d.; BUT SD Boston Globe, May 81, 1977, at 1, col 8. 
53 The Soviets discount any dangerous eft'ccts of the microwave radiation by show-
ing it is of the type found near TV and radar stations and much leBB dangerous 
than X-rays. Id. But, for a polemic against this view Bee Mi/J1'otDCJ111J11 II, IIUprCJ note 3, 
at 66-72. 
Ii4Mu SORENSEN (eel.), MANUAL 01' PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 758 (1968). 
(Emphasis added, hereinafter cited as SORNSEN). 
MId. 
1i6Id. 
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wrong:" However, "normally" this is only the general rule 
when the listening is being done from contiguous land not under 
the jurisdiction of the ·State whose emissions are being heard.1I8 
Since a foreign embassy is still technically considered within the 
sovereign jurisdiction of the host country,1I9 eavesdropping from' 
the embassy premises may not as easily fall within the inter-
national toleration of such practices. 
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention states in part, "The 
premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incom-
patible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the 
present Convention". Is eavesdropping a use of the premises 
which is compatible with the diplomatic function f Recourse 
could be had to Article 3 of the Convention which states: 
1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in : 
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and devel-
opments in the receiving State and reporting thereon to the 
Government of the sending State. 
But this is circuitous and of no real help as it merely changes 
the form of the question back to the oriS'inaI, i.e., is eavesdrop-
ping lawful activity' 
Assuming, arguendo, that eavesdropping from the embassy 
is unlawful; that alone is not enough to justify the Soviets bom-
bardment of microwaves as a reprisal. Another condition of 
reprisals is that it "must be proportionate to the injury suf-
fered, that is, they cannot result in losses and injury dispropor-
tionately greater than those caused by the delinquent State ... " 80 
It is with this condition that an attempt to characterize the 
bombardment as a reprisal meets great difficulty. It is submitted 
117 Rubin, Alfred. Beisure of the Pueblo: Bome International Law ..t1spects, 114 
Congo Bec. 2350 (February 6, 1968); 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, at 241 (1974); 18 
INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 961, at 968 (1969). 
118Id. 
119 Bee note 35, supra, which points out the disrepute of the exterritoriality doctrine. 
But, compare Soviet domestic law: •• premises occupied by diplomatic miBBions • • . 
enjoy exterritorial rights .•• " Harvard Research Paper, supra note 36. 
SO SORENSEN, supra note 54, at 753. 
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that the two actions can be differentiated by the fact that eaves-
dropping seems to be an entirely passive activity whereas the 
radiation bombardment is clearly active. This alone shows little, 
but certainly where reprisals are concerned, other passive acts 
would be preferable to active ones. 
Secondly, the U.S. violation would be that of Article 41, para-
graph 3 of the Vienna Convention which prohibits using the 
diplomatic mission in a manner inconsistent with the function 
of the mission.81 The Soviet violation would be that of the in-
violability of the diplomatic agents,82 families, staff 83 and of 
the premises itself." The disproportionality of these two "vio-
lations" is illustrated by the commentary of the International 
Law Commission to Article 40 paragraph 3 811 of the "Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities": 
Paragraph 3 stipulates that the premises of the mission 
shall be used only for the legitimate purposes for which they 
are intended. Failure to fulfill the duty laid down in this 
article does not render article 20 (inviolability of the mission 
premises) inoperative, but on the other hand, that inviola-
bility does not authorize a use of the premises which is in-
coD;lpatible with the functions of the mission." 
The purport of this statement would seem to all but preclude 
the Soviet's action being justified as a reprisal. The privilege of 
. inviolability can in no way be deemed to sanction or authorize 
using the embassy premises improperly (e.g., eavesdropping), 
81 "The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible 
with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by 
other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force be· 
tween the sending and receiving state." Vienna Convention, supra note 8, Art. 41. 
It should be remembered that for purposes of analysis it has been IJ8sumed this 
eavesdropping is a violation of international law. No claim is being made as to 
whether eavesdropping from an embassy would violate Article 41 in absence of 
such an assumption. 
62 Vienna Convention, ""'pra note 8, Art. 29. 
681d., Art. 37. 
"14., Art.22. 
M Draft Article 40 paragraph 3 was adopted by the Vienna Convention as Article 
41 paragraph 3 with only immaterial grammatical changes being made in its wording. 
II YEARBOOK OF THE INT'L L. COMM. 78, at 104 (1958). 
"ld.; WHITEMAN supra note 35, at 360-61. 
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but the fact that they are being used improperly does not justify 
violating the premises' inviolability. This does not foreclose 
all types of reprisals by the Soviets but it does foreclose any re-
prisal on their part which would consist in a violation of in-
violability (which would include microwave bombardment). 
The most obvious action which would easily meet the reprisal 
condition of proportionality would be the very same type of 
action giving rise to the reprisal. In other words eavesdropping 
of the U.S. from the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. This 
is in fact an action already established in Washington by the 
Soviets,8T which in itself throws additional weight to a conclu-
sion that the Soviet's microwave radiation bombardment is a 
violation in international law to which no legitimate defense can 
be raised. 
ID. WlUT REMEDIES MAY EXIST FOR THE UNITED STATES' 
-Given the above conclusion. One may ask what is to be done 
about it' At the time of this writing the bombardment was still 
proceeding, although the day to day levels had been reduced to 
well below previous highs.88 The State Department was proceed-
ing via "all channels" 88 to get the bombardment stopped. N ego-
tiations, the first step, are underway TO and settlement by these 
means is the most desirable.T1 
8T NY Times, February 26, i976, at 1, col. 3. 
ea NY Times, July 8, 1976, at 1, col. 1. 
88 Dixie Grimes Conversation, suprA note 3; Boston Globe, May 31, 1977, at 1, 
col. 3. 
TO Negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have been under way at least 
since February, 1976. NY Times, February 13, 1976, at 6, col. 1. The Carter Ad· 
ministration is continuing negotiations under Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and 
reportedly does not take the matter lightly. Boston Globe, May 31, 1977, at 1, col. 3. 
Tt If negotiations should break down there is a whole panoply of possible pro· 
cedures ranging from mediation and conciliation to judicial procedures, &ee SOREN· 
SEN, supra note 54, at 673·737. It should be noted however that the U.S.S.R. did 
not sign the optional Protocol (to the Vienna Convention) Concerning Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes, which in e888nce means that they do not have to submit 
to jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over this matter. 500 U.N.T.S. 
242 (1964). Several reasons can be speculated as to why resolution of this problem 
may be diflicult. First there is the continuing mystique of detente, with the ac-
companying desire to reach a strategic arms' control agreement. Administration 
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If negotiations break down, the United States could resort to 
some form of retaliation to try and persuade the Soviets to cease 
their bombardment. This article will not presume to suggest 
any specific action which the U.S. should take, however, it will 
suggest the limits to which such action can go within the bounds 
of legality. 
First, the U.S. is bound by article 2 (3) of the United Nations 
Charter: T2 "All Members shall settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice are not endangered." Likewise 
article 2 (4) states that States should refrain from the use or 
threat of force.78 
.secondly, any U.S. action would have to meet the require-
ments of reprisal. Reprisals, as previously discussed, are acts 
in response to the unlawful acts of another State which them-
selves would be unlawful if committed in isolation. The condi-
tions which must be met for an act to be considered a reprisal are: 
1) The offending State's act must have been unlawful; 2) Re-
dress must be demanded before counteraction is taken; 3) The 
counteraction taken must be proportional to the offending act.T4 
Condition one has already been met as. has been shown.TII The 
second condition too has been met as evidenced by negotiation 
policies may relegate the microwave bombardment to a relatively low priority. See-
ondly, the State Department has a dilemma in pursuing this matter. To vigorously 
pursue its claims requires the revealing of possible health hazards to the U.S. citizens 
being exposed. Yet since the State Department has known of the existence of the 
radiation for some time it may be SUbjecting itself to liability for not pressing its 
claims earlier or disclosing the possible health hazards to its employees. Thirdly, 
since the Soviet radiation bombardment levels a.re well below the official U.S. safety 
standard, to claim these levels are harmful implicitly undermines the validity of 
the U.S. standard, which standard has been used for the United States' defense 
systems. Thus a change in the standard could literally threaten hundreds of billions 
of dollars worth of defense and military installations (virtually every advanced 
defense weapon employs radar, which is a form of microwave radiation). 
T21 U.N.T.S. xvi (1945); 39 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 190, at 191 (1945). 
T8Id. 
74 SORENSEN, 8'Upra note 54, at 753. 
Til Bee text accompanying notes 15-43, .tupra. 
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and protests.711 Thus, the third requirement, that of proportion-
ality, is the crucial one which any U.S. counteraction must meet. 
Of course, the exactly proportional reprisal would be the 
microwave bombardment of the USSR embassy in Washington. 
But this has been already precluded as a possible counteraction 
by the State Department because to do so would be "im-
moral." 77 Any other action of course would have to be sub-
jected to a specific analysis balancing the degree of harm, type 
of injury, etc., which the contemplated act will commit with the 
degree of harm, type of injury, etc., already being inflicted by 
the microwave radiation. But in no case may the reprising act 
exceed the compulsion which would reasonably be necessary to 
secure settlement.78 
Other actions involving the Soviet diplomatic mission's privi-
leges and immunities would be the most likely candidates to meet 
this test. Restricting travel privileges,79 the use of wireless com-
munications,8o or the exemption of custom duties 81 are also a few 
possibilities. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal implications of the Soviet's practice of bombarding 
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with microwaves are significant in 
and of themselves. Such practices arguably violate four sepa-
rate articles of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immuni-
ties,82 and perhaps customary international law as well.83 Any 
claims of possible justification for such violations can meet the 
legal requirements of neither retortion nor reprisal.IM 
The concern over this Soviet practice, however, goes beyond 
the normal considerations accompanying a violation of inter-
76 NY Times, February 13, 1976, at 6, col. 1; NY Times, May 20, 1976, at 3, col. 
6; Boston Globe, February 16, 1976, at 1, eol. 1, May 31,1977, at 1, col. 3. 
77 NY Times, February 29, 1976, Sec. IV, at 2, col. 3. 
78 SORENSEN, supra note 54, at 753. 
79 Vienna Convention, supra note 8, Art. 26. 
80 I d., Art. 27. 
81 ld., Art. 36. 
, 82 Articles 22, 29, 30, and 37. Vienna COllvention, supra note 8. 
83 See notes 9 and 15, 8upra. 
1M See notes 50-67, and accompanying text, 8U'!Ira. 
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national law. As was stated in the introduction, the legal con-
siderations are only one aspect of this affair. The primary 
concern should, foremost and always, be the health of those 
individuals within the embassy who must be subjected to the 
bombardment without knowing what the consequences may be. 
LAlmy B. GUTHRIE 
